Al-Zaidi’s test: can Iraq disarm Iran-backed militias?

IRAQ

Washington and Baghdad are pursuing a closer economic partnership. But can Iraq’s prime minister deliver security reform without provoking Iran-backed factions at home?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s first visit to Washington has seen both sides signal that business, rather than security, will define the next phase of US-Iraq relations.

Ahead of the meeting, al-Zaidi cast security reform as the foundation of Iraq’s economic revival, arguing that bringing armed groups under state control would allow Iraq to open a “new phase” in its partnership with Washington.

President Donald Trump struck a similarly transactional tone, telling reporters the United States would be “doing a lot of deals” with Iraq and that American companies would help develop the country’s oil sector

“Iraq has tremendous potential because of their oil,” Trump says. “We’re going to be doing a lot of deals. We’re going to create a lot of jobs for both countries, and we’re going to be taking out a lot of oil.”

It comes as Trump confirmed that US forces will leave Iraq by 30 September, marking the end of a 23-year presence in the country “We don’t think we need the military there anymore” he said, adding: “The relationship is a whole big relationship where we don’t need the military.”

Al-Zaidi embraced the shift, replying: “US forces will be out of Iraq by Sept. 30, while US companies will be inside Iraq.”

Writing three days before the visit, al-Zaidi said his government was committed to ensuring that “the state possesses the legitimate monopoly on the use of force”, arguing that a stronger state would unlock Iraq’s economic potential.

He has set 30 September as the deadline for non-state armed factions to surrender their heavy weapons, timed to coincide with the formal end of the international coalition’s mission in Iraq.

The date is intended to mark what al-Zaidi calls a new phase in Iraq’s relationship with the United States.

But the policy is also the clearest test yet of whether Iraq can persuade Iran-backed factions that exchanging military power for political influence serves their interests without destabilising the coalition that brought him to office.

According to Sibylline’s latest assessment, there is a 65% probability that Iraq achieves at least partial integration of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) into the state security apparatus over the coming 12 months.

The report cautions, however, that complete disarmament remains highly unlikely.

For Omar Khadr, Sibylline’s Middle East and Africa analyst and author of the report, that distinction is critical.

“The objective isn’t really to make these groups disappear,” Khadr says. “It’s about changing the way influence is exercised. If political power replaces military power, Iraq becomes significantly more stable.”

Al-Zaidi’s political position helps explain why he is attempting reforms that many predecessors avoided.

A businessman rather than a career militia figure, he emerged as the consensus choice of Iraq’s Shia Co-ordination Framework because he was viewed as someone capable of balancing competing interests while restoring investor confidence and rebuilding Iraq’s economy.

That emphasis on business also dovetails with Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy. Rather than framing Iraq primarily as a security partner, the White House has increasingly presented it as an economic opportunity, highlighting prospective American investment in energy, infrastructure and reconstruction.

Yet that vision depends on Iraq convincing investors that the state – not armed factions – ultimately controls the country’s security.

The PMF is not a single organisation but an umbrella grouping of militias with differing loyalties, ambitions and relationships with Tehran.

Some factions have become increasingly invested in Iraq’s political institutions, while others remain closely aligned with Iran’s regional strategy.

Khadr says those internal differences give Baghdad room to negotiate.

“The PMF isn’t monolithic,” he says. “Some groups are much more willing to negotiate because they already see political legitimacy as more valuable than maintaining independent military capabilities.”

Among the more pragmatic organisations are Kata’ib al-Imam Ali and factions that increasingly value their place within Iraq’s political system. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq likewise balances considerable political influence with its military role.

Greater resistance is expected from hardline groups including Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, both of which remain deeply sceptical of surrendering military autonomy despite government pressure.

Another significant variable is cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Although outside the PMF structure itself, Sadr commands a powerful political movement capable of shifting Iraq’s domestic balance should he choose either to support or oppose al-Zaidi’s reforms.

Rather than insisting on outright disarmament, Baghdad appears to be pursuing negotiated integration.

Heavy weapons would increasingly come under state oversight while fighters move into formal security institutions or civilian politics, allowing influential factions to preserve status without maintaining the same degree of independent military capability.

Khadr believes that reflects political reality.

“If you demand total disarmament immediately, you’re almost guaranteeing failure,” he says. “Negotiated integration gives these groups a path to retain relevance without relying on armed coercion.”

Iran’s own calculations may also favour such an outcome.

While Tehran values the deterrent provided by Iraqi militias, preserving long-term political influence inside Baghdad may prove more valuable than maintaining every armed capability, particularly if regional tensions continue to fluctuate.

That does not eliminate the risks.

Should negotiations stall or hardline factions reject the process, Iraq could find itself caught between competing pressures.

Washington would question whether Baghdad had delivered meaningful reform, while Iran-backed groups could accuse the government of yielding to American demands. Either outcome would undermine the confidence that Baghdad hopes will attract international investment.

For Trump, the withdrawal fulfils a longstanding objective of ending overseas military commitments no longer considered essential. But replacing troops with trade will only work if Baghdad can demonstrate that it – not Iran-backed armed groups – controls Iraq’s security.

For al-Zaidi, that means persuading powerful factions to exchange military leverage for political influence without provoking confrontation with Tehran or destabilising the coalition that brought him to power.

As Khadr concludes: “These groups are not going anywhere, and Iran is not going anywhere. Integrating them into the Iraqi political sphere is far more plausible than trying to confront them from the sky. Political influence is still influence, but it is much less dangerous than military influence.”