Collapse of flagship fighter project lays bare Europe’s defence dilemma

EUROPE

What began as a cornerstone of Franco-German defence cooperation has become a reminder of how national interests continue to frustrate Europe’s ambitions for greater strategic autonomy.

EUROPE’S flagship attempt to build a sovereign next-generation fighter aircraft has collapsed at precisely the moment the continent is questioning how much it can rely on the United States for its security.

The Future Combat Air System (FCAS), launched in 2017 by France and Germany and later joined by Spain, was intended to become the backbone of future European air power.

Built around a sixth-generation fighter, autonomous systems and an integrated combat cloud, the programme was designed to demonstrate that Europe could develop cutting-edge military capabilities without depending on Washington.

Instead, after years of disputes between Airbus and Dassault over leadership, intellectual property rights and workshare, the project has effectively been abandoned.

Its failure comes at an awkward moment.

Germany’s federal security agencies warned earlier this year that Russia could be capable of waging a large-scale conventional war on NATO by 2030.

Across Europe, military planners are reassessing force structures and defence spending amid concern the continent may soon shoulder more of its own security burden.

Against that backdrop, the collapse of FCAS raises uncomfortable questions about Europe’s ability to translate strategic urgency into collective action.

“It is quite symbolic,” says Caspar von der Schulenburg, Europe analyst at Sibylline.

“For the European rearmament project, industrial politics still outranks strategic urgency.”

Announced in the wake of Brexit, FCAS was conceived as both a military capability and political statement.

Paris and Berlin hoped it would anchor a more integrated European defence industrial base and demonstrate that Europe’s two leading powers could produce a world-class combat aircraft together.

Yet the industrial compromise underpinning the project never fully satisfied either side.

France, through Dassault, secured leadership of the Next Generation Fighter, the programme’s centrepiece and most valuable component.

Germany was given responsibility for autonomous systems and the combat cloud, an arrangement many within German industry regarded as commercially and politically unbalanced.

Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at RUSI, says the project’s structural weaknesses were apparent from the outset.

From the French perspective, Dassault had spent decades designing combat aircraft largely on its own and was reluctant to surrender authority over what it viewed as a core national capability.

From the German perspective, however, the arrangement left Berlin carrying much of the financial burden while enjoying less influence over the programme’s most valuable technologies.

“France has the expertise to do a fighter. But it doesn’t have the money,” says Bronk.

“And Germany has the money. But industrially, doesn’t really have the expertise.”

Von der Schulenburg describes the collapse as “a slow death”, noting that speculation over the programme’s future had persisted for months despite repeated attempts by Paris and Berlin to rescue it.

The deal might have survived had Europe remained as it was in 2017.

Instead, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine transformed Germany’s approach to defence.

Berlin established a €100bn (£86bn) special defence fund, loosened long-standing fiscal constraints and embarked on the most significant military expansion since the Cold War.

Defence spending is now on course to exceed four per cent of GDP, a dramatic shift from the assumptions underpinning the original FCAS agreement.

Professor Alessio Patalano of King’s College London says Germany today is very different from the Germany that signed up to the project eight years ago.

“Germany has undergone a sea change in its defence posture,” he says.

As Berlin’s defence ambitions expanded, FCAS became less about political symbolism and more about industrial influence, military requirements and national priorities.

The implications extend beyond France and Germany.

FCAS and the rival Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), involving Britain, Italy and Japan, have represented competing visions of future air power.

With FCAS effectively dead, attention is likely to shift increasingly towards the UK-led programme.

This week has been a turbulent one for European defence.

Reports of a reduced US military footprint were accompanied by the departures of Defence Secretary John Healey and defence minister Al Carns following disagreements over defence spending, highlighting broader questions about whether Britain’s military ambitions are being matched by long-term investment.

Bronk says GCAP continues to make progress technically and remains ahead of FCAS in several respects.

The programme’s challenge is not engineering but political certainty. Funding remains unresolved, but Bronk argues the strategic case for the programme has only strengthened.

“The geopolitical reasons for doing it are much, much more compelling than they were back then,” he says.

The timing is particularly sensitive because Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is due to visit Britain, Italy and France ahead of the G7 summit.

As one of GCAP’s three partners, Tokyo will be seeking reassurance that political turbulence in London does not translate into uncertainty for the programme.

The collapse of FCAS raises a question that would have seemed improbable only a few years ago: could Germany gravitate towards GCAP?

Patalano believes the possibility deserves serious consideration.

Germany would bring industrial capacity, political weight and financial resources at a time when questions persist over long-term defence funding.

“Britain is already looking for partners and investment in GCAP. Germany has money, industrial capacity and strategic weight. Why wouldn’t you at least have the conversation?” he says.

Others are sceptical.

Bronk notes that Germany’s frustrations with FCAS stemmed largely from disputes over industrial workshare, intellectual property and design authority. Those concerns would not necessarily disappear inside an existing multinational programme where Britain, Italy and Japan are already established partners.

FCAS’s demise highlights a broader challenge confronting Europe.

European governments increasingly agree on the threat environment. It is far less clear that they agree on the solution.

Von der Schulenburg says the collapse of FCAS, uncertainty over British defence spending and signs of a reduced American commitment to Europe risk reinforcing perceptions of alliance disunity at precisely the wrong moment.

Crucially, he argues, such developments increase the likelihood of Russia testing NATO’s resolve as Moscow positions assets around key NATO approaches.

“The Russians will be loving this,” he says.

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