Fuel shortages keep Ethiopian civil war at bay

ETHIOPIA

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is expected to secure another overwhelming election victory on 1 June, but analysts warn fuel shortages may be delaying a renewed civil war as tensions with Tigray continue to rise.

ETHIOPIANS head to the polls on 1 June in elections that are almost certain to deliver another overwhelming victory for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party.

Yet while the result itself is scarcely in doubt, analysts believe a far more consequential question hangs over the country: whether Ethiopia is moving towards another civil war.

According to Benedict Manzin, Sibylline’s Lead MEA Analyst, tensions between Addis Ababa and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) continue to intensify as both sides prepare for renewed confrontation.

However, one factor may have delayed any immediate escalation.

Fuel shortages linked to disruption in global energy markets have weakened one of the Ethiopian government’s most important military advantages: its ability to deploy drones and air power at scale.

“Before the Hormuz crisis, it looked like the Ethiopians were gearing up to go in,” says Manzin.

“What happened in Hormuz massively put those war plans on the back foot.”

The governing Prosperity Party is expected to secure a commanding majority in both federal and regional assemblies amid widespread restrictions on opposition parties, security concerns and the likely cancellation of voting in several conflict-affected areas.

According to Sibylline, elections are likely to be suspended across large parts of Amhara and Oromia because of ongoing insurgencies, while voting may be cancelled across much or all of Tigray.

“The Prosperity Party will almost certainly win an overwhelming majority,” says Manzin.

The election comes at a sensitive moment for Ethiopia and forms the focus of a new Sibylline report examining the country’s evolving security outlook.

While the Pretoria Agreement formally ended the devastating Tigray War in 2022, tensions between Addis Ababa and the TPLF have steadily intensified.

The TPLF has increasingly challenged the authority of the transitional administration established under the peace agreement, arguing that the federal government has failed to honour key commitments.

“They are basically saying the Pretoria Agreement is null and void because the federal government isn’t following through on its promises,” says Manzin.

“There is a degree of truth to that. The federal government has been restricting fuel supplies and financial transfers into Tigray.”

Federal authorities, however, accuse the TPLF of failing to fulfil their own obligations under the peace deal, particularly around disarmament and cooperation with post-war governance arrangements.

As a result, analysts increasingly view renewed confrontation as a growing possibility.

The significance of the election lies less in who wins than in who emerges feeling politically strengthened.

A smooth vote, limited disruption from insurgent groups and broad public acceptance of the result could convince Abiy Ahmed that he has a fresh mandate to take a tougher approach towards Tigray.

Equally, signs of weakness could encourage the TPLF to pursue its own ambitions more aggressively.

“If the election results are received without much public criticism and the disruption from insurgent groups is less severe than expected, that could embolden Abiy Ahmed to take a much tougher approach to the TPLF,” says Manzin.

“If the elections expose weaknesses, that could embolden groups like the TPLF to pursue their objectives more aggressively.”

The TPLF has already begun re-establishing some of the governing structures that existed before the war, directly challenging the transitional authorities backed by the federal government.

For now, much of this challenge remains political. However, analysts warn it could evolve into a direct struggle for control.

“They might start trying to seize government offices. They might start levying their own taxes and trying to run the territory themselves in a much more substantial way,” says Manzin.

Unlike many separatist movements, however, the TPLF’s ambitions are not necessarily centred on independence. Many within the movement still see themselves as a national political force capable of regaining influence beyond Tigray, rather than creating a separate state.

During the Tigray War, the federal government relied heavily on drone and air operations, particularly with support from the United Arab Emirates. UAE-supplied drones played a critical role in reversing Tigrayan advances and helping force the conflict towards its conclusion.

“It was a key factor in bringing the Tigray War to an end,” says Manzin.

“The Ethiopian government was able to establish substantial aerial superiority over the Tigrayans. Once that happened, it was effectively game over.”

The election is also expected to coincide with heightened security risks elsewhere in Ethiopia.

Militant groups including the Fano movement in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army are likely to increase attacks during the electoral period, viewing participation in the vote as an endorsement of a government they reject.

Security forces are expected to respond with increased deployments, raising the risk of clashes, transport disruption and localised violence.

However, Sibylline assesses that any unrest in Addis Ababa is likely to remain limited and short-lived, with weakened opposition mobilisation reducing the likelihood of sustained demonstrations.

For international investors, the election is unlikely to alter Ethiopia’s broader economic direction.

Abiy Ahmed has continued to pursue economic liberalisation, including efforts to open parts of the economy to greater private participation and foreign investment. While conflict and political instability remain major obstacles, Ethiopia’s population of more than 100 million people makes it one of Africa’s most significant potential growth markets.

Washington also continues to view Ethiopia as a strategically important regional power. As the home of the African Union and one of the Horn of Africa’s dominant states, Ethiopia remains an important partner despite years of tension between Addis Ababa and the US over the conduct of the Tigray War.

“The US knows Ethiopia is a regional heavyweight,” says Manzin.

“It sees itself as a hegemon of the region. It’s a substantial market for potential US engagement, particularly if Ethiopia continues to liberalise its economy.”

Yet despite the near certainty surrounding the election result, far greater uncertainty surrounds what comes next.

“These are two sides that are aware that a military confrontation is probably in their future at some point,” says Manzin.

“It’s really a question of when.”

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