Germany’s anti-war movement poses new challenge to Europe’s rearmament

July 7, 2026

MILITANT far-left activists are increasingly targeting Germany’s critical national infrastructure as Berlin embarks on its biggest military expansion in decades, according to a new security assessment warning Europe’s rearmament drive is creating new sabotage risks beyond the defence sector.

The Sibylline assessment concludes that electricity substations, railway networks, telecommunications systems and logistics hubs are becoming more exposed as anti-war groups broaden their campaign against Germany’s expanding defence industrial base.

The warning comes as Chancellor Friedrich Merz accelerates a historic shift in German defence policy. Berlin now plans to borrow more than €800 billion by 2030 to fund defence and infrastructure investment, while annual defence spending is projected to rise from €109 billion next year to almost €184 billion by the end of the decade, placing Germany at the centre of Europe’s rearmament.

That transformation, however, is also fuelling opposition.

“The messaging is increasingly becoming one of ‘welfare versus warfare’,” says Alexander Lord, Sibylline’s Lead Europe Analyst and author of the report.

“These groups argue that money should be spent on welfare and social programmes rather than defence. Unlike in the UK, however, Germany has a significant number of extremists who are prepared to put that into practice.”

Germany’s military expansion follows Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and growing concern Europe must shoulder more responsibility for its own security as the United States reassesses its military commitments to the continent.

But Sibylline argues that rising defence budgets, the possibility of future conscription and broader concerns over military spending are becoming increasingly effective mobilisation tools for Germany’s militant far left.

At the same time, economic stagnation and pressure on public finances are reinforcing calls to direct resources towards healthcare, welfare and environmental priorities.

While Germany’s political centre remains broadly supportive of continued military investment and backing for Ukraine, opposition is becoming louder at both ends of the political spectrum.

Lord notes that parties on the hard left have consistently opposed higher defence spending, while elements of the populist right have questioned Germany’s support for Kyiv and sought closer relations with Moscow.

That political landscape has become even more fluid after the left-wing populist Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) proposed cooperating with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) in eastern state elections, arguing the political “firewall” isolating the AfD should be broken.

While unrelated to extremist activism, the proposal underlines how opposition to Berlin’s rearmament cuts across ideological boundaries.

Screenshot

Rather than concentrating solely on defence manufacturers, activists are increasingly targeting the infrastructure that keeps Germany’s military-industrial base operating, including electricity substations, railway signalling, telecommunications systems, logistics hubs and energy infrastructure.

“It isn’t a transition,” Lord says. “It’s an ‘and’.

“They’re still targeting defence companies, but they’re also targeting the infrastructure that supports them because they recognise that’s often a more effective way of causing disruption.”

That substantially broadens the number of organisations exposed to disruption.

“It doesn’t matter if you’re in defence,” Lord says.

“If you’re in close proximity to these organisations, you are vulnerable because there is now a clear modus operandi that sees these groups targeting critical national infrastructure which businesses and private citizens rely upon.”

One militant group recently claimed responsibility for attacking an electricity substation because a defence company operated nearby, illustrating how businesses with no direct involvement in military production can become targets by sharing infrastructure with defence suppliers.

The report warns that technology companies, telecommunications providers, logistics firms, semiconductor manufacturers and energy operators supporting the defence industrial base could face heightened disruption as activists widen their target set.

Sibylline also concludes that Russia is likely to exploit the growing unrest.

Lord is careful to distinguish between influence and direction.

“The Russians work most effectively when they are exacerbating an existing threat rather than creating one from scratch,” he says.

“The far-left scene in Germany is well established. The Russians will inevitably be trying to exacerbate that. We have ample evidence of similar influence operations across Europe where the Russians are seeking to spread misinformation and malinformation in a bid to encourage protests, sabotage and wider instability.”

He stresses there is no evidence Moscow is directing Germany’s anti-war movement.

“That’s not to say Moscow is directing these individuals,” Lord says.

“But a lot of the anti-capitalist sentiment currently focused on Germany’s defence sector serves Russia’s interests perfectly. They will want to encourage that trend.”

Germany’s strategic importance makes it an obvious target.

It has become one of NATO’s principal logistical hubs for supporting Ukraine while simultaneously rebuilding its own armed forces after decades of underinvestment.

The government’s latest budget plans envisage hundreds of billions of euros of additional borrowing to accelerate defence procurement and modernise the infrastructure on which that military expansion depends.

“If you have far-left extremists attacking defence infrastructure for their own reasons, that is something which also serves Russian interests,” Lord says. “So there is a symbiosis here.”

Despite the escalating threat, Sibylline assesses Germany remains a relatively low-risk environment for corporate executives, with organised campaigns of violence against senior defence figures remaining unlikely. Instead, the greatest danger comes from operational disruption, harassment, sabotage and reputational campaigns intended to impose economic costs and slow Germany’s military expansion.

For Europe, the implications extend well beyond Germany.

Berlin now sits at the heart of the continent’s effort to rebuild military capability while continuing to supply Ukraine.

As Germany embarks on its largest debt-funded military build-up in decades, disruption to the infrastructure underpinning that effort could have consequences across NATO’s European members at precisely the moment governments are warning they must prepare for a more confrontational relationship with Moscow.

“Germany already faces significant resilience and capability challenges,” Lord says.

“The attacks we’re seeing will inevitably have a detrimental impact on Germany’s, and more broadly Europe’s, ability to rearm as quickly as possible.

“Germany is at the heart of the EU’s rearmament programme. But it also faces the most entrenched and sophisticated far-left opposition anywhere in Europe.”