Greenland’s unfinished business

Greenland

Talks may have eased tensions, but the forces driving US pressure – and the risk of miscalculation – remain.

IMMEDIATE tensions may have ebbed, but little about Greenland has actually been resolved.

Donald Trump has claimed victory, suggesting a new accord would give the United States “total” and indefinite access to the Danish territory.

Those closest to the talks, however, are less convinced.

As Alexander Lord, Sibylline’s Lead Europe Analyst and author of a new Special Report on Greenland put it: “We don’t really know what’s been agreed, and my suspicion is not much has been.”

What appears to exist so far, he said, is “a way of working and moving forward”, rather than anything binding.

Behind the scenes, sources expect an amended version of the 1951 US-Denmark defence agreement, which already grants Washington wide latitude to operate militarily on the island, including maintaining bases.

Alongside that, there are growing signs of a Ukraine-style strategic partnership on critical raw materials, loosening Greenland’s mining rules and opening the door to greater US investment.

That combination would allow Trump to claim a political win without provoking a backlash in Europe or forcing Denmark into an impossible position.

It would also avoid the legal and financial quagmire of attempting to acquire Greenland outright.

Despite weeks of inflammatory rhetoric, few serious observers ever believed the United States was preparing to militarily invade a NATO ally.

In Sibylline’s Special Report (written before Wednesday night’s apparent breakthrough) analysts put the likelihood at just 13%.

Trump is known to prefer deal-making to conflict, and an armed seizure of Greenland would have carried immense political and alliance costs.

At the most extreme, that could have included jeopardising trade deals and US access to European air bases.

With the exception of last year’s B-2 strikes on Iran, which flew directly from Missouri, virtually every US military operation in the Middle East relies on staging posts in Europe, notably Britain’s RAF Lakenheath and Germany’s Ramstein Air Base.

As Lt Gen Jason Armagost, now deputy commander of US Air Force Global Strike Command, put it only last year: “Our Bomber Task Force is incredibly effective in the European theatre… From Europe, we can fly to Africa, we can fly to the Middle East. And that has been done just in the last few weeks. This is of incredible value.”

Those realities helped pull the crisis back from the brink.

But the risk remains.

Any economic agreement involving Greenland’s resources is likely to touch EU rules, potentially slowing negotiations and testing Trump’s patience.

That frustration could push Washington towards grey-zone tactics – coercive but deniable measures designed to force momentum without crossing into open confrontation.

These could include economic pressure, disruptive political signalling, or limited cyber and communications interference aimed at raising costs without triggering a formal NATO response.

Such activity would stop well short of open force, but could still have real economic and political impact on Greenland, while testing Denmark’s ability – and Europe’s willingness – to respond.

The danger is that Trump gambles on Europe rolling over and misjudges how far allies are prepared to push back.

Historically, the United States has sought influence over Greenland for more than a century.

During the Second World War, Washington occupied the island to deny Nazi Germany access to cryolite, vital for aircraft production.

When the war ended, reluctance to withdraw led to the 1951 defence agreement that still governs US access today.

The irony is that if national security alone were the driver, Washington already had ample room to act.

As Lewis Galvin, Sibylline’s Lead Americas Analyst, observed: “At the moment, the current defence agreement with Greenland is essentially they can surge as many troops as they want, as many assets as they want, and place them for as long as they want.”

Instead, the US steadily reduced its footprint, from around 6,000 troops during the Cold War to roughly 150 today at Pituffik Space Base.

That reality has led many analysts to conclude the confrontation was driven by something else: resources.

Greenland’s growing importance as a source of critical minerals has collided with Washington’s effort to reduce dependence on China-dominated supply chains.

In 2023, the European Commission identified Greenland as a potential source of 25 critical minerals. Galvin was explicit about priorities: “Securing US almost uninhibited access to critical minerals is probably the cornerstone of US foreign policy under Trump.”

Denmark, for its part, has long encouraged US investment.

“The Danes have been pretty keen to try and get some external, namely US investment in Greenland, for many years,” Lord noted. “US businesses just haven’t expressed much interest.”

What changed was not Danish resistance, but American urgency – not just for control of critical minerals, which would take years to develop, but for a political win.

“Having already shown a disregard for Congress, the next two years could be dangerous if Trump’s aim is to solidify legacy moments,” Galvin warned.

For now, allies are breathing easier.

But as Lord cautioned: “If negotiations aren’t going the way that Trump wants them to then, again, we could see an increase in tensions over the issue.”

The gamble lies not in what just happened, but in what comes next.