If Hormuz can’t be secured, what hope for the South China Sea?

Maritime

US strikes on Iran exposed the limits of military power and deterrence, with rivals already drawing lessons from the disruption

THE United States’ recent military campaign against Iran has exposed fresh doubts about its ability to guarantee the security of the world’s most critical sea lanes, after talks aimed at stabilising the Strait of Hormuz broke down.

This weekend’s collapse of negotiations leaves Tehran with the upper hand over one of the world’s most vital energy corridors, unless Washington is prepared to take more definitive action – a step analysts say would carry significant military and political risks.

The breakdown follows weeks of conflict under the US-led campaign, dubbed Operation Epic Fury, which sought to degrade Iran’s military capabilities, suppress its ability to threaten maritime traffic and ultimately force it back to the negotiating table. While US officials point to damage inflicted on missile infrastructure, air defences and launch sites, the operation has fallen short of its broader strategic aims.

Iran retains the ability to disrupt shipping through asymmetric tactics, including drones, naval mines and proxy attacks. That residual capability has proved decisive, allowing Tehran to maintain pressure on commercial traffic despite sustained bombardment and US naval deployments in the region.

Sibylline analysis suggests that, although degraded, Iran’s military infrastructure remains sufficiently intact to sustain intermittent disruption over an extended period.

The result is a strategic dynamic in which Tehran does not need to win outright to exert leverage – only to maintain uncertainty, elevate risk and drive up the cost of transit.

Noam Ostfeld, Sibylline’s Principal Middle East Analyst, says Iran’s approach has been calibrated to maximise pressure without triggering its own destruction.

“It’s enough to have one drone attack every three to five days to keep disruption in place,” he notes, adding that even limited strikes are sufficient to deter commercial shipping and insurance cover.

Iran also retains the option of widening disruption beyond Hormuz itself.

Renewed Houthi attacks in the Red Sea or escalation by proxy forces in Iraq could extend pressure across multiple maritime corridors, amplifying the global economic impact and complicating any US-led response.

Despite the scale of US and Israeli strikes, Tehran has shown little sign of conceding core demands.

Instead, it has sought to leverage its position, both militarily and economically, in negotiations, raising the prospect of a sustained stand-off in which time favours the defender.

The failure to secure freedom of navigation through Hormuz has prompted broader questions about US deterrence. Analysts point to three areas of concern: military capability, risk tolerance and strategic planning, all of which have been tested by the campaign.

Lewis Galvin, Sibylline’s lead Americas analyst, says the operation has highlighted “limitations in the US’s military capability, its risk appetite, and its planning assumptions”.

While the US retains overwhelming force on paper, translating that into sustained control of contested waterways has proved far more difficult in practice.

The challenge is not simply one of firepower. Securing a chokepoint such as Hormuz requires persistent naval presence, effective mine countermeasures and the ability to deter low-cost, high-impact attacks – all of which demand time, resources and political commitment that Washington has historically struggled to sustain.

Commander Tom Sharpe, a maritime defence expert, says the real danger lies not in the immediate disruption, but in the precedent it sets.

The cost of rerouting or insuring shipping will ultimately be absorbed, he argues. “Shipping is elastic. It goes into spasms, the market reacts, and then it smooths out. That is not the issue.”

Instead, the concern is that the rules governing global trade routes are being quietly eroded.

If one state can impose costs or restrictions on a critical waterway without decisive pushback, others may draw similar conclusions, particularly in regions where sovereignty and control are already contested.

And the stakes could not be higher.

Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz, while the South China Sea carries an estimated one-third of global maritime trade. Together, they form the backbone of the global economy – arteries that depend on predictable access and enforceable norms.

China has in recent years tightened its maritime posture in the South China Sea, expanding coastguard powers, reinforcing its “nine-dash line” claims and consolidating its presence across the first island chain.

A new five-year maritime plan is expected to further enhance Beijing’s ability to police disputed waters and assert control over key transit routes.

Aedan Moricai, Sibylline’s lead Asia-Pacific analyst, says China is likely to draw mixed lessons from the conflict. “On one hand, the US is capable of huge destruction,” he says. “But that doesn’t necessarily translate into achieving strategic goals.”

Beijing is also likely to emphasise the contrast between US volatility and its own preferred image as a stable trading partner. At the same time, it will be studying how relatively limited disruption, whether by Iran or non-state actors such as the Houthis, can have outsized effects on global commerce.

Justin Crump, Sibylline’s chief executive, says the conflict reinforces a broader trend in modern warfare, where tactical success does not guarantee strategic outcomes. Precision strikes and air campaigns can degrade capabilities, but they do not necessarily translate into control of territory or sea lanes.

“There was never sufficient combat power to actually stop Iran taking the course of action it chose,” he says, adding that anti-access strategies, from drones to mines, can make contested environments extremely difficult to re-enter once lost.

What is at risk is not simply the security of individual routes, but the assumption that they remain open at all.

“Once you accept that Hormuz can be controlled,” says Commander Tom Sharpe, “you’re accepting that the world’s trade routes are up for grabs.”

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