Iran: will Trump blink?

IRAN

As economic pressure mounts and hardliners tighten their grip in Tehran, the outcome may hinge on whether Washington holds its nerve.

DONALD TRUMP can still force Iran to the brink, but only if he holds his nerve, analysts say.

That tension was thrown into sharper relief this weekend when Donald Trump cancelled planned talks in Islamabad after it became clear that key figures in Tehran, including Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, had been sidelined.

The parliamentary speaker, who had warned internally that Iran could not sustain a prolonged conflict, was forced to step back as chief negotiator after a rebuke from senior IRGC generals over his attempt to include nuclear energy issues in talks with the US.

His marginalisation, alongside the growing influence of more uncompromising figures such as veteran negotiator Saeed Jalili, points to a negotiating posture that is hardening rather than softening.

Behind the diplomacy, however, the confrontation between Washington and Tehran has become a contest of endurance.

For Professor Ali Ansari of the University of St Andrews, the United States has already demonstrated a clear operational advantage.

“On a strictly military basis… [the US has] performed with remarkable precision,” he says, pointing to the scale of damage inflicted alongside relatively low civilian casualties.

But that success, he argues, has not yet been matched politically.

“What they haven’t done… is the politics behind it,” he says, adding that Washington has struggled to articulate a clear endgame.

At the same time, Iran’s position is more fragile than it appears.

A year ago, the US dollar was worth 800,000 rials. Today it is worth 1.55 million on the informal market which, under other circumstances, might have pushed many Iranians, their savings wiped out and import prices out of reach, to the point where they felt they had nothing left to lose.

Ironically, the war itself, with its unifying enemies, internet blackout and risk from bombing, has so far helped contain that pressure.

There are also warnings that Kharg Island may be nearing storage capacity, with the US naval blockade preventing oil from being offloaded.

“In a matter of days, Kharg Island storage will be full and the fragile Iranian oil wells will be shut in. Constraining Iran’s maritime trade directly targets the regime’s primary revenue lifelines,” said US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

It leaves the US and Iran locked in a game of “chicken”, says Prof Ansari.

“At this point it is about who will blink first,” he says.

“The US has greater economic resilience. Iran is in very, very bad shape, and I think they were caught unawares by the US naval blockade.”

With the arrival of the USS George W Bush, the US now has three carrier groups in the Middle East for the first time since 2003.

The current strategy centres on blockading Iranian ports and targeting the regime’s main revenue sources, with the next phase likely to focus on opening the Strait of Hormuz.

This could see US forces occupying key islands, including Qeshm, significantly increasing pressure on Tehran without amounting to a full-scale invasion.

But even that level of pressure may not be decisive.

Despite evidence of division, it is the hardliners who appear to have the upper hand.

With new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei believed to be recovering from serious injury, it is former defence minister and IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi who is spearheading policy.

When protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 threatened the regime, it was Vahidi who played a key role in the crackdown.

“There are people in the regime who genuinely think Iran can sustain a prolonged conflict and defeat the United States,” says Ansari.

He suggests this overconfidence is rooted in the legacy of the Iran–Iraq war, when leaders believed victory remained within reach even as the country was exhausted.

To understand how that plays out in practice, analysts say it is necessary to look beyond the formal structures of the Iranian state.

“There’s a tendency to talk about splits within the Iranian system,” says Megan Sutcliffe, a Middle East analyst at Sibylline.

“But this isn’t really a division. It’s a shift in how power is exercised.”

In practice, she argues, decision-making authority now sits firmly with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its associated security networks. “The government functions as the diplomatic arm,” she says. “But the decisions come from the IRGC.”

That dynamic helps explain both the rigidity of Iran’s negotiating position and its willingness to absorb economic pain.

While civilian officials may engage in talks, they do so within parameters set by a hardline security establishment for whom key issues, including nuclear sovereignty and control over maritime access, remain non-negotiable.

With ultimate authority resting elsewhere, negotiations risk becoming, at best, an exercise in signalling rather than a genuine effort to reach compromise.

“The US is effectively negotiating with the middleman,” Sutcliffe adds.

Even so, there are signs that Tehran is not simply playing for time.

According to Damon Golriz, a strategic analyst at the Hague Institute of Geopolitics, events in Hormuz have convinced Iranian hardliners that the country could emerge as a “fifth power” in a more fragmented global order.

That ambition is underlined by Tehran’s confirmation that it has begun collecting tolls from vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“Iranians are ready to negotiate,” he says. “They are ready to make concessions because the emphasis is shifting from ideological victory to regime survival.

“They could give up their 440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium and pause enrichment for a few years. But that would depend on a mechanism guaranteeing their security.

“This is very different to surrender. There is no path to that short of a full-scale invasion, and you would need boots on the ground for that.”

With talks now abandoned, the trajectory points towards further escalation – and the focus shifts squarely to Washington and to Trump’s next move.

For Ansari, the outcome now hinges on a single question.

“Trump is likely to lose the midterms one way or another,” he says.

“So he might as well push further and see if he can pull something out of this.

“The question is whether the West has the political will.”

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