Kim Jong Un and the China-Russia tug of war

NORTH KOREA

Xi Jinping’s first visit to Pyongyang in seven years highlights North Korea’s growing strategic importance as Beijing seeks to preserve influence, Moscow deepens wartime ties and the prospect of future US engagement remains on the table.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping travelled to North Korea this week for the first time in seven years, underscoring the growing importance Beijing places on its relationship with Pyongyang.

Xi has dramatically reduced his overseas travel in recent years, preferring instead to receive foreign leaders in Beijing.

His decision to travel to the Hermit Kingdom therefore reflects North Korea’s growing strategic importance at a time when Russia’s war in Ukraine has elevated Kim Jong Un’s value to both Moscow and Beijing.

While official statements focused on friendship and co-operation, the visit also highlighted a broader shift in Northeast Asia.

As North Korea’s relationship with Russia has deepened, Beijing has found itself balancing two competing objectives: preserving its position as Pyongyang’s most important partner while benefiting from Moscow’s willingness to share the burden of supporting one of the world’s most isolated states.

Xi’s previous visit to Pyongyang came in 2019, when North Korea was at the centre of diplomatic efforts involving then US President Donald Trump.

According to Jonah Kaplan, Principal Asia Analyst at Sibylline, the current visit carries a similar message, albeit in a very different geopolitical environment.

“What’s even more different between 2019 and 2026 is that, since Covid, Xi’s travel has been highly restricted and even post-restrictions he’s only gone on a couple of trips over the past year. They’re very selective and they’re very purposeful.”

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with military support ranging from artillery ammunition to ballistic missiles and manpower.

While none of these contributions have been decisive individually, they have helped Russia sustain a long and costly war.

“From the Russian perspective, the relationship with North Korea has taken on newfound strategic importance since the invasion,” says Alexander Lord, Lead Europe-Eurasia Analyst at Sibylline.

“The North Koreans have been open in their active involvement and support for the war in Ukraine.”

Lord argues that Russia and North Korea have developed a relationship built on practical exchanges.

While North Korea has little to offer economically, it possesses large stockpiles of military equipment and resources that Russia can utilise.

In return, Moscow can provide energy, food supplies and potentially access to military technologies that remain beyond North Korea’s domestic capabilities.

On one hand, Beijing benefits from having another state share the burden of supporting North Korea.

On the other, it has little interest in seeing Russia emerge as the dominant external influence over one of its most strategically important neighbours.

“I think they do want themselves to have the most influence over North Korea compared to anyone else, including Russia,” says Aedan Mordecai, Lead Asia Pacific Analyst at Sibylline.

“At the same time, I don’t think they are against Russian support for North Korea all together.

“Supporting North Korea also carries risk because it attracts negative international attention. Russia is already persona non grata from that point of view.”

Despite growing co-operation, Russia and China remain partners of convenience rather than natural allies.

While the two countries currently share many interests, particularly in opposition to aspects of the Western-led order, underlying tensions remain.

Parts of the region were once controlled by Qing China, and historical sensitivities surrounding Russia’s Far East and Siberia have never entirely disappeared. Beijing and Moscow do not always share the same long-term strategic ambitions.

The relationship is best described with the Song dynasty idiom: “same bed, different dreams” – a pragmatic relationship built on overlapping interests but fundamentally lacking shared goals or a common vision.

“There are lots of areas where Russian and Chinese interests do not align,” says Lord.

“But at the moment there are far more areas where they align than not.”

That underlying mistrust makes North Korea increasingly valuable to both sides.

Future US-North Korea engagement under Trump cannot be ruled out.

Beijing may have its own reasons for encouraging such engagement.

Sibylline previously assessed that a future agreement focused on freezing North Korea’s nuclear programme, rather than eliminating it altogether, cannot be ruled out.

Mordecai notes that facilitating dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang would allow China to offer the US a potential diplomatic success without making significant strategic concessions of its own.

Reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula could also help limit the rationale for a larger US military presence in Northeast Asia, an outcome that would align with Beijing’s broader regional interests.

Russia may also have an interest in facilitating dialogue.

Encouraging discussions over a nuclear freeze could strengthen Putin’s relationship with Trump and create leverage in wider negotiations linked to the war in Ukraine.

Such a move, if taken by Kim, would reduce sanctions pressure while leaving North Korea with a capable nuclear arsenal.

Yet, despite the entreaties from his biggest allies, Kim may have little incentive to engage.

Continued Chinese support, deepening ties with Russia and billions of dollars generated through cyber-enabled cryptocurrency theft have strengthened the regime’s position, reducing the need to trade strategic concessions for sanctions relief.

“North Korea would feel like it’s in a better position than it was five years ago,” says Mordecai.

Meanwhile, North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities while developing increasingly lucrative cyber operations that provide an alternative source of revenue despite sanctions.

The visit does not necessarily signal a crisis in China’s relationship with North Korea, nor does it suggest Beijing is seeking to push Russia aside.

Rather, it reflects a recognition that the regional balance has shifted significantly since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

The result is that while Xi, Putin and potentially Trump all have their own reasons for engaging with North Korea, the biggest beneficiary may be Kim himself.

As Kaplan puts it: “North Korea has more leverage than it ever has in its history.”

Stay ahead of emerging risk. Get notified whenever Sibylline publishes a new report.