No war, no peace: The Middle East’s dangerous new normal

IRAN

Iran’s attacks on commercial shipping have put the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding under its greatest strain yet. But rather than collapsing, it has evolved into a “no war, no peace” phase in which military action and negotiations now unfold simultaneously.

DONALD Trump may have declared the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) effectively dead, but the latest exchange of air strikes and missile attacks has not ended the diplomatic process.

Instead, Washington and Tehran appear determined to keep the process alive while using carefully calibrated military action to strengthen their negotiating positions.

That is the assessment of Sibylline Principal Middle East and Africa Analyst Megan Sutcliffe, who believes the region is entering what she describes as a “no war, no peace” phase in which military action and diplomacy increasingly proceed side by side.

The latest crisis began when Iran fired on five vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, arguing they had failed to follow approved shipping routes established under the MoU.

Washington rejected that justification, accusing Tehran of maintaining the de facto closure of one of the world’s most strategically important waterways and responding with strikes against Iranian naval, missile and drone infrastructure.

Iran retaliated with attacks on US military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, while President Donald Trump declared the agreement effectively dead before authorising further strikes. Yet despite the rhetoric and military exchanges, Sutcliffe believes neither side is seeking a return to the kind of sustained conflict seen during Operation Epic Fury.

“I suppose one of the ways that I have seen this being referred to is this ‘no war, no peace’ model,” she says. “Right now we’re not looking at the war resuming and we’re also not looking at peace. This sort of model of negotiations under fire and conditions of no war and no peace is the most likely outcome, at least for the next few weeks.”

The latest exchanges underline a broader shift in the way both governments are pursuing their objectives.

Rather than using military force instead of diplomacy, Washington and Tehran increasingly appear to be using limited military action to shape the negotiations themselves. Each side is attempting to increase pressure on the other without crossing the threshold into the kind of sustained conflict neither currently appears to want.

For the Trump administration, the latest strikes are less about restarting the war than enforcing key elements of the MoU, particularly the commitment to restore normal commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Tehran, meanwhile, insists it retains a legitimate role in regulating maritime traffic and argues vessels should comply with routes agreed under the new framework.

The disagreement goes to the heart of one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

While Washington continues to reject any suggestion that Iran should effectively control access to the Strait, the MoU envisages Tehran and Oman negotiating a future administrative framework governing navigation through the waterway.

That raises the prospect of an eventual service charge for commercial shipping, allowing both sides to claim success while avoiding politically contentious language around Iranian “tolls”. Such an arrangement would also allow each side to present the outcome as a diplomatic victory without either appearing to have conceded sovereignty or freedom of navigation. For Tehran, it would amount to international recognition of a role in administering one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

For Washington, it would allow the White House to argue that freedom of navigation had ultimately been restored without making explicit political concessions to Iran.

The military restraint shown by Washington is also shaped by the lessons of Operation Epic Fury.

Although the campaign inflicted significant damage on Iranian military infrastructure, Sutcliffe says the White House recognised that further gains would have required a much riskier escalation.

“I think Trump has certainly shown that he can turn the tap of military action on and off,” she says. “But turning it back on is not something that we’ve really seen yet.”

She argues the administration became increasingly aware of the law of diminishing returns as the operation progressed.

US forces had already struck much of the infrastructure capable of delivering immediate military gains, while Tehran continued launching missiles and showed little sign of changing its negotiating position. Any attempt to achieve a decisive victory would likely have required deploying US personnel onto Iranian territory, dramatically increasing both military and political risks.

Instead, Sutcliffe believes Trump is now pursuing three broader strategic objectives.

“The first is reopening the Strait of Hormuz,” she says. “The second is establishing a more permanent ceasefire so that the United States can be more flexible in where it deploys its naval assets. The third goal is getting a nuclear agreement that he can characterise as being superior to the JCPOA.”

Taken together, those objectives help explain why Washington continues to apply military pressure while simultaneously leaving the door open to negotiations.

The greatest danger now may not be deliberate escalation but miscalculation.

Every exchange of missiles, drones or air strikes increases the risk of unintended civilian casualties, damage to critical infrastructure or attacks on third countries that could rapidly overwhelm the careful restraint both sides have shown.

That uncertainty is also forcing Gulf states into an increasingly delicate balancing act. Most have sought to avoid being drawn directly into any confrontation while recognising that renewed fighting would threaten both regional stability and the energy exports on which their economies depend.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have sought to preserve channels of communication with Tehran while avoiding becoming directly involved in the conflict. Bahrain and Kuwait, however, have already found themselves targeted by Iranian retaliation because of their role in hosting US military facilities, underlining how quickly neighbouring states can become caught up in even limited exchanges.

Even Israel, despite continuing operations against Hezbollah and maintaining pressure on Iran’s regional proxies, is unlikely to derail negotiations unilaterally, Sutcliffe says.

“I don’t think Israel will act as a spoiler,” she says.

“However, if we were to see Iran responding with a drone or missile attack targeting Israel, I think Israel would be happy to take the gloves off, at least for a few hours.”