Putin’s mobilisation dilemma could define the next phase of the Ukraine war

UKRAINE

Both Russia and Ukraine face mounting pressure to replenish their forces, but while Kyiv lacks manpower, Moscow must decide whether widening mobilisation is worth the domestic political cost.

THE next six to 12 months are likely to shape the next phase of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with looming mobilisation decisions determining whether the conflict continues at its current intensity well into 2027, according to a new assessment by geopolitical risk consultancy Sibylline.

After more than four years of high intensity fighting, battlefield attrition is placing growing pressure on both countries’ ability to replace military losses.

While Ukraine continues to struggle with an increasingly acute manpower shortage, Russia’s challenge is different.

The Kremlin still has access to extensive reserves of personnel, but expanding mobilisation would expose President Vladimir Putin to growing political risks at home.

“The decisions that the Kremlin and, to an extent, Kyiv will be making over the next six to 12 months will tell us a lot about the determination, particularly of Moscow, to weather more costs and sustain the war,” says Alexander Lord, Lead Europe Analyst at Sibylline.

“If they do implement large-scale mobilisation reforms, that is a clear indication that the Kremlin has not abandoned its war objectives in Ukraine and is willing to sustain significantly higher casualties in order to achieve those objectives.”

Ukraine’s manpower problem is no secret.

Years of attritional warfare have steadily reduced the pool of available recruits, while millions of Ukrainians have left the country since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Recruitment has become increasingly difficult, while retaining experienced personnel is an equally pressing challenge.

According to Ukrainian officials, around two million people are currently evading military service, while approximately 200,000 personnel are absent without leave.

Together, the figures underline the widening gap between those eligible to fight and those actually serving.

Kyiv has sought to reverse the trend through a package of recruitment reforms, including improved pay, guaranteed leave and fixed service contracts. It is also attempting to attract significantly larger numbers of foreign volunteers.

Yet Sibylline assesses those measures are unlikely to generate deployable manpower quickly enough to offset continuing battlefield losses.

The report also pours cold water on suggestions that technology alone can solve Ukraine’s manpower deficit.

Drones have transformed the battlefield and allowed Ukrainian forces to impose heavy losses on Russian troops while reducing risks to their own forces.

But they cannot occupy trenches, rotate exhausted units or seize and hold territory.

As a result, Ukraine’s long-term challenge remains largely demographic.

Lowering the mobilisation age would expand the recruitment pool but risks provoking significant domestic opposition as the war drags on.

Russia, however, faces a very different calculation.

Unlike Kyiv, Moscow is not running out of people.

It is running out of politically painless ways to recruit them.

Since the partial mobilisation announced in September 2022, the Kremlin has largely avoided another nationwide call-up, relying instead on generous financial incentives, regional recruitment campaigns and other forms of indirect mobilisation.

The strategy has enabled Russia to sustain offensive operations while shielding much of the country’s urban population from the war’s direct impact.

There are signs, however, that the approach is becoming harder to sustain.

Recruitment has reportedly slowed from around 1,000 to 1,200 volunteers a day during early 2025 to around 800 by the beginning of this year.

At the same time, Russia is estimated to be spending more than USD 20 million every day on sign-on bonuses, much of it funded by regional governments.

Sibylline concludes that while current recruitment levels are likely to sustain Russia’s existing operations through the remainder of this year, they are unlikely to support a significantly larger military commitment in 2027 without broader mobilisation.

That leaves Putin facing a dilemma.

Russia possesses a much larger demographic base than Ukraine and maintains extensive reserves that could be called upon if required.

The question is not whether the Kremlin can mobilise more personnel, but whether it is prepared to bear the domestic political consequences of doing so.

“The burdens of the war are not equally spread,” says Lord.

“The metropolitan Slavic populations have been broadly cushioned from the true impacts of this war.”

Instead, much of the burden has fallen on poorer regions and ethnic minority communities, limiting the political impact on Putin’s core support base.

That equation would change if the Kremlin began drawing more heavily on its active mobilisation reserve.

“If we were to see Russia tapping that active mobilisation reserve, we will start to see much more of an impact in that metropolitan Slavic population,” Lord says.

“That’s Putin’s core constituency that he needs to maintain the support of.”

Rather than issuing another politically explosive mobilisation decree, Sibylline assesses that Moscow is more likely to expand what it describes as rolling mobilisation, gradually calling up reservists under legislation introduced last year while avoiding the symbolism and public backlash associated with another nationwide mobilisation.

Its most likely scenario sees Russia maintaining the strategic initiative while Ukraine continues resisting unfavourable peace terms through recruitment reforms and growing reliance on drones.

The result would be another year of attritional warfare rather than a decisive breakthrough, pushing the prospect of a stable ceasefire well into 2027.

Lord says the Kremlin is also likely to draw lessons from history before taking any decision to widen mobilisation.

“Afghanistan will be looming large in the minds of recruiting strategists,” he says.

“That was a very different war. This is a major conflict and different rules apply. But over time we saw increasing resentment and soft resistance begin to build, particularly amongst those demographics most heavily impacted.”

While cautioning against direct comparisons, he believes Afghanistan remains the closest historical example of how a prolonged war can erode public tolerance.

For Putin, he argues, that history will be impossible to ignore as Russia weighs the costs of asking more of its own people.

“If they do implement large-scale mobilisation reforms,” says Lord, “that is a clear indication that the Kremlin has not abandoned its war objectives in Ukraine and is willing to sustain significantly higher casualties in order to achieve those objectives.”

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