Russia is failing in Mali – and Africa is watching

MALI

Moscow’s counter-insurgency model is faltering , as Islamist advances risk Europe’s energy supplies

RUSSIA’S setbacks in Mali are exposing the limits of its ability to wage a sustained counter-insurgency campaign.

A surge in coordinated jihadist attacks across the country has underlined the strain on Moscow’s Africa Corps, with Islamist groups expanding their reach in the north and striking close to the capital, Bamako.

The scale and tempo of the offensive have raised fresh questions about whether Russia can deliver on the core promise that drew Mali’s military leadership into its orbit: restoring security.

“The Russians have done very poorly militarily – the loss of Kidal is frankly humiliating,” says Sibylline’s lead Middle East and Africa analyst, Benedict Manzin.

Despite a more aggressive approach than their Western predecessors, Russian-backed forces have failed to halt the spread of al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, which now operates across large parts of the country and is increasingly capable of mounting coordinated, large-scale attacks.

Mali’s pivot towards Russia was driven by the belief that a less constrained partner would prosecute the war against jihadists more aggressively than France and the United Nations, whose operations were shaped by political and human rights considerations.

Despite recent attempts by Bamako and Moscow to show political unity, however, Africa Corps commanders on the ground have increasingly signalled a desire to shift away from frontline combat and focus instead on protecting critical infrastructure and the regime in Bamako.

The result is a widening gap between Russia’s military performance and its political utility.

Bamako has spent between $500m and $900m since 2022 to sustain Russia’s military presence, according to some estimates. Recent setbacks – including the retreat from the northern desert town of Kidal, which left Malian soldiers trapped – have sharpened questions about what that investment has delivered.

“There will be officers that think we should chuck this relationship with Russia in and turn to someone else,” Manzin says.

“They thought they needed a partner that would not demand observance of human rights and that this would result in victory.

“But they were wrong. It didn’t work.”

Instead, that strategy appears to have backfired.

Heavy-handed operations have alienated communities and created conditions in which insurgent groups can expand.

“It antagonised a population that was then recruited by JNIM and allowed them to expand,” he says.

Yet Russia’s position in Mali remains entrenched, despite its battlefield shortcomings.

If the Africa Corps cannot hold back the Islamists’ advance, its presence can at least provide insurance against the fallout.

While insurgent groups advance and the state’s grip on territory weakens, the regime in Bamako remains intact, shielded in part by Russian support.

“There is every reason to expect another coup,” says Manzin.

“As a personal bodyguard to Goïta, these troops are one of the main cards ensuring his own personal security.”

This has produced a model that prioritises regime survival over territorial control – one that is proving durable even as the security environment deteriorates.

The implications extend beyond Mali.

Russia’s approach is increasingly being tested as a template across parts of Africa, where military governments face persistent insurgencies and internal instability.

In such contexts, the ability to guarantee regime survival may outweigh the failure to deliver broader security outcomes.

“They won’t now get hired by the government of the DRC in their fight against the M23 rebel group,” says Manzin.

“But they will get hired by the new Malagasy junta that just wants to mitigate against a palace coup.”

At the same time, the deterioration of security in Mali is feeding a wider regional risk.

As militant groups consolidate control and push southwards, instability is increasingly likely to spill into coastal West African states, including Ghana and Senegal.

That creates a longer-term strategic concern for Europe.

As governments seek to diversify energy supplies and reduce dependence on Russia, West Africa has emerged as a potential alternative source.

A widening arc of instability across the Sahel would place that strategy under pressure, complicating investment and increasing risk across the region.

That exposure will only deepen if instability spreads into coastal producers such as Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal, where European energy interests are growing.

As Russia’s influence falters, the United States has begun to re-engage with Mali’s military-led government, marking a pragmatic shift in its approach to the Sahel as jihadist insurgencies expand and geopolitical competition intensifies.

After years of strained relations following the withdrawal of Western forces, Washington is now prioritising intelligence-gathering and limited cooperation, alongside a broader “trade, not aid” approach, rather than pushing for immediate democratic reforms.

Yet that re-engagement remains cautious. While it reflects growing concern over the spread of Islamist groups and the risk of further regional destabilisation, there is little indication that the US is willing to commit troops or play a deeper security role on the ground.

France, once the dominant external security actor in Mali, was forced out after the military junta tore up defence agreements and recast Paris as a hostile force. That political rupture continues to constrain European options, even as security conditions deteriorate.

Some analysts believe President Emmanuel Macron could be tempted to re-engage if invited, particularly if it offered a chance to restore French influence in West Africa – though such a move would carry significant political and military risk.

“It may well come down to Macron looking for legacy,” says Manzin.

In the meantime, Mali risks partition.

In a more extreme scenario, that outcome could reshape the regional security landscape entirely, with instability spreading beyond Mali into coastal West Africa and threatening emerging energy partners.

“What we could end up with is a sort of Islamist government in the heart of West Africa,” says Manzin.

“At that point the rest of the world will have to decide whether or not they want to treat it like Afghanistan or Syria.”

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