Russia probes Europe’s infrastructure as UK defences fall short

RUSSIA

EU inquiry links GRU to parcel attacks as concerns grow over ports, supply chains and subsea networks

AN EU investigation has concluded that Russian military intelligence was behind a series of incendiary parcel attacks across Europe and the UK, confirming that Moscow has been testing the continent’s logistics networks as part of a wider campaign of hybrid warfare.

The finding, which attributes the operation to the GRU, marks a significant escalation in Europe’s assessment of the threat. What initially appeared to be isolated incidents – parcels igniting at courier depots and on transport routes – is now assessed to have been a coordinated effort to probe vulnerabilities in air freight and supply chains.

Parcels ignited at DHL-operated facilities in Leipzig and Birmingham, while another caught fire on a truck near Warsaw. Investigators believe the incidents may have been test runs for attempts to trigger explosions aboard cargo aircraft bound for the United States. In one case, a device ignited prematurely before it could be loaded onto a London-bound flight, underlining how close the operation may have come to causing far more serious disruption.

According to Sibylline’s latest UK and Ireland Resilience Monitor, the attacks highlight the continued evolution of Russian grey-zone tactics, combining reach with deniability. Investigators believe those used to send or transport the parcels may not have been aware of their contents, pointing to a growing reliance on unwitting proxies who can be discarded while shielding state involvement.

“This fits a broader pattern of Russian behaviour,” Lord says.

“What we’re seeing is a sustained effort to test European systems below the threshold of war.”

That pattern is now forcing a reassessment of what constitutes critical infrastructure – and how it should be protected.

In Belgium, authorities have announced plans to deploy air defence systems at the port of Antwerp-Bruges, one of Europe’s most important logistics hubs, following suspected drone activity targeting critical infrastructure.

The system – a Norwegian-US NASAMS platform capable of intercepting drones, aircraft and cruise missiles – will make Antwerp-Bruges the first European port to receive dedicated air defence, reflecting a shift in how such sites are viewed: no longer purely commercial assets, but strategic nodes vulnerable to state-backed disruption.

Antwerp-Bruges is Europe’s second-largest port and a critical hub for petrochemicals, military equipment and industrial goods. Any sustained disruption would have immediate consequences for supply chains. Analysts assess that other major ports, including Felixstowe, Rotterdam and Hamburg, may follow with similar protective measures.

The concern is not limited to aerial threats. Analysts warn that maritime drones – low-cost, remotely operated vessels capable of targeting ships or port infrastructure – are likely to form part of any future hybrid campaign, with UK ports such as Felixstowe seen as potentially exposed.

“The era of broadly stable operating conditions in Europe is ending,” Lord says.

“Organisations need to be thinking about resilience in a much more fundamental way.”

A more immediate concern, however, is the extent to which such infrastructure is currently defended.

“If the Royal Navy can’t do it – and we know how little it can do – then we have none. Literally none,” says Commander Tom Sharpe, a maritime security expert.

“From a physical defence perspective, there is absolutely nothing.”

“With the exception of Faslane, our ports are undefended. You could sail whatever you liked in there, even in a canoe, and have a go at it.”

The implications extend beyond ports.

The report highlights concern about the vulnerability of subsea infrastructure, including fibre-optic cables and energy pipelines that connect the UK to Europe and North America – systems that underpin financial transactions and military communications but remain difficult to monitor and protect.

Ireland’s newly launched National Maritime Security Strategy reflects growing recognition of that risk, aiming to expand naval capability and deepen co-operation with the UK and France, particularly in protecting subsea infrastructure and countering activity linked to Russia’s shadow fleet.

However, the scale of the challenge is stark. Plans for an extra 12 vessels will take years to realise. In the meantime, personnel shortages mean Ireland can currently deploy only two naval vessels at sea at any one time, leaving large areas of its waters lightly monitored.

“They are the western bastion of the Atlantic,” Sharpe says. “They need to step up. Neutrality won’t protect them – Russia doesn’t care about that.

“And all those tech hubs won’t continue to invest unless they believe Ireland is safe.”

For the UK, the exposure is significant.

Much of the infrastructure underpinning transatlantic connectivity passes through Irish waters, placing additional strain on already stretched Royal Navy resources.

Reports that British vessels may be required to patrol Irish waters during Dublin’s upcoming EU presidency underline the extent to which the UK may need to compensate for capability gaps.

At the same time, reduced defence spending and recruitment challenges have limited the Royal Navy’s ability to expand its operational footprint.

“The UK’s western approaches are becoming more strategically significant,” Lord says. “They are also increasingly vulnerable.”

Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift in the nature of risk facing the UK and its allies.

Rather than a single threat, organisations are confronting a convergence of pressures centred on infrastructure – from covert sabotage and drone activity to maritime vulnerabilities and supply chain disruption.

What the EU investigation provides is clarity. The parcel attacks were not anomalies, but part of a deliberate effort to identify weaknesses in the systems that sustain modern economies.

“This isn’t about isolated incidents,” Lord says. “It’s about understanding where the pressure points are – and how they might be exploited.”

For governments and businesses alike, the message is increasingly difficult to ignore. The infrastructure that supports daily life is no longer operating in a benign environment.

But for those responsible for defending it, the gap between risk and capability is widening.

“When our ports come under attack, people will look to the Navy,” Sharpe says.

“But the cupboard is bare.”

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