Russia’s shadow war escalates as Europe struggles to respond

GERMANY

The failed Leipzig drone attack exposed Europe’s vulnerability to Russian sabotage. But governments’ reluctance to attribute and confront such operations could make the next attack more dangerous.

A SMALL quadcopter carrying 800 grams of Semtex strikes the wing of a Ukrainian-owned Antonov aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport, close to the fuel tanks.

But the explosive package becomes dislodged and its detonator fails.

Four hours pass before a bus driver spots the drone and alerts security.

Media outlets, citing an internal police document, report that the aircraft was carrying ammunition for Ukraine. Germany’s Interior Ministry, Antonov Airlines and the airport deny the claim.

Sibylline assesses Russia was highly likely responsible, although German authorities have yet to formally attribute the attack.

But the person who launched the drone need not have piloted it.

“If the drone was controlled through a SIM card, the pilot could have been sitting virtually anywhere,” says Sergej Sumlenny, CEO of German-Ukrainian drone producer United Unmanned Systems.

“It could have been Moscow, or a Russian diplomatic mission facility in Berlin or even New York. As long as the drone had a stable mobile connection, distance would make little difference.”

Someone would still have needed to transport and launch it close to Leipzig.

“The pilot could be thousands of miles away, but somebody would still have to bring the drone within flying range of the target,” Sumlenny says. “For a quadcopter like this, that would probably be no more than around 15-20km because of the battery.”

The mobile network would also help explain why airport systems failed to detect it.

“Military bases can detect the standard radio frequencies used by many commercial drones,” he says.

“But if the drone is communicating through a SIM card, it looks like another ordinary mobile connection. You do not necessarily see it unless you jam the mobile network itself.”

Sumlenny says the basic process of weaponising a drone is not difficult, but several steps must be completed correctly.

“If the drone struck its target without exploding, either the detonating mechanism malfunctioned or it was assembled incorrectly,” he says.

For Moscow, the immediate objective was likely to disrupt Western military assistance to Ukraine and demonstrate that the logistics network sustaining it is vulnerable.

Leipzig is DHL’s principal European hub and a crucial logistics artery for military equipment bound for Ukraine, making it a valuable target for Moscow.

It was previously targeted during a Russian-attributed parcel-bomb campaign in 2024, when a flight delay may have prevented an incendiary device exploding aboard an aircraft.

“An attack like this shows that Russia is able to target a strategic site linked to logistics supporting Ukraine,”says Sibylline Eurasia Analyst Karan Vassil.

Even failure benefits Moscow. Airport closures and tighter screening can delay deliveries, impose costs and force governments to divert resources towards protecting infrastructure.

Vassil says the lack of a Western response will incentivise Russia to continue probing Europe for weaknesses.

But responding requires formal attribution, and that carries consequences governments may prefer to avoid.

“Attribution is a balancing act in which the scales are weighted in Russia’s favour,” says Sibylline Europe Analyst Caspar von der Schulenburg.

Publicly blaming Moscow would force Berlin to acknowledge the threat and justify spending on defence and resilience. It could also weaken support for Ukraine.

“An attack on German soil could produce one of two reactions,” von der Schulenburg says. “People could rally around the flag. Or they could say: this is what happens when you support Ukraine. You bring the war home, and now there is German blood on the government’s hands.”

“The rally-around-the-flag response we might have seen 20, or even ten years ago, is increasingly unlikely given the polarised nature of Western politics.”

Yet von der Schulenburg believes Germany’s hesitation is a mistake.

“The era of plausible deniability should be over,” he says.

“There is too much caution, too much hesitancy and too much fear. The longer attribution takes, the more it encourages further attacks.

He adds: “We have known for a long time that Russia has the capability.

“The permissive security environment European governments have allowed to be created has provided the opportunity. With Leipzig, we now see that Russia also has the intent.”

Even if the Semtex had detonated and caused civilian casualties, von der Schulenburg believes Germany’s response would probably have been similar, only bigger: harsher rhetoric, stronger counter-drone measures and possibly NATO Article 4 consultations, rather than a fundamental change in posture.

This reluctance may not be entirely irrational.

“If I were a decision maker looking at the pace of European rearmament, it would make rational sense to try to buy time,” says Sibylline Europe Associate Analyst Annabelle Walker.

“Air defences are not ready, and countering drone threats remains incredibly expensive and inefficient. New initiatives and more advanced systems are being introduced, but that takes time.”

The gamble is that Europe can strengthen its defences before Russia stages an attack governments cannot avoid answering.

The threat extends beyond Germany and Poland. Following reports that British-made drones were used for strikes inside Russia, Moscow has warned that the UK will face “consequences”.

Walker says opposition to supporting Ukraine is weaker in Britain than in Germany.

A serious Russian attack could make Moscow feel less like an abstract threat and increase support for defence spending and stronger action.

But today’s fragmented information environment makes any rally-around-the-flag response difficult to predict. Walker assesses that the risk of grey-zone activity against British defence companies, military facilities and supporting infrastructure is increasing.

Yet buying time carries its own price. Every muted response allows Moscow to refine its methods, test another target and push closer to the threshold separating sabotage from open conflict.

“Military and civilian infrastructure in both the West and Russia is extremely vulnerable,” Sumlenny warns. “The reason we do not see explosions every day is not because such attacks are impossible. It is because, until now, those responsible have feared the political consequences.”

“Germany can lull itself into believing that it is not at war with Russia. But war is not a tango. Tango needs two. War needs only one aggressor – and Russia is already at war with Germany and the UK.