The fate of Iranians may hinge on a single number

IRAN

Economic turmoil is fuelling protests across 84 towns and cities but has not yet threatened the regime. That could change if the rial falls much further. Will China come to the rescue?

THEY are protesting in their thousands, yet the fate of Iranians may be decided not on the streets but by a single number: the value of the rial.

AS the currency plunges and inflation bites, demonstrations have spread from shuttered bazaar stalls in Tehran to nightly clashes in 84 towns and cities across more than 30 provinces – further inflamed by water shortages and failing infrastructure in several regions.

Despite the breadth of unrest, the initial surprise was the regime’s restraint. For several days, security forces held back from the kind of mass-casualty response that traditionally follows large-scale demonstrations in Iran, relying instead on tear gas, baton charges and targeted arrests.

That period has now ended. Over the weekend, the government reverted to type, with rights groups confirming more than 500 deaths as live fire was used in multiple provinces under the cover of a nationwide communications blackout.

But the tipping point, Sibylline warns, is not the size of the crowds but the depth of the economic crisis.

A year ago, the US dollar was worth 800,000 rials. Today it is worth 1.46 million on the informal market. Much of the slide caused by the reimposition of sanctions over Tehran’s decision to continue developing its nuclear programme.

If it sinks beyond roughly 1.55 million to the dollar, today’s unrest could tip into a much broader revolt.

“If the rial drops below about 1.55 million, we are in a different scenario,” says Megan Sutcliffe, principal analyst for the Middle East at Sibylline.

“At that point, people feel they have nothing left to lose. Savings would be wiped out, imports priced out of reach and frustration pushed far beyond the limits of controlled repression.”

There is one pinpoint of light at the end of this tunnel for the beleaguered regime: Beijing.

Recent US actions on Venezuela have tightened oil supplies to China, forcing Chinese refiners to look elsewhere for discounted heavy crude – and Tehran is poised to fill the gap.

Beijing already buys the bulk of Iran’s crude at heavy discounts, and any surge in demand would give the government the hard currency it needs to buy rials off the street and slow the collapse.

“China pays in dollars for the oil, even though Iran discounts it,” Sutcliffe says.

“If Beijing is concerned about losing Venezuela, it might up demand, at which point Iran may be able to access more dollars, and that gives the government room to stabilise the currency.”

Without that support, analysts warn the 1.55 million threshold could be crossed within weeks.

In the meantime, Donald Trump’s warnings of support for Iranian opposition groups have generated more heat than light.

The recent US-brokered removal of a sitting head of state in Venezuela has reverberated across the globe, and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains sealed inside Tehran’s fortified command structure.

But any comparison between Venezuela and Iran is flawed for a simple reason: there is no Delcy RodrÍguez-style figure waiting in the wings, and Washington has no clear successor it could plausibly back without fracturing Iran’s already delicate internal balance.

Khamenei, now 86, has spent years preventing any one figure from consolidating authority. Mojtaba Khamenei enjoys influence within security circles but lacks clerical legitimacy. Sadeq Larijani has religious standing but carries political baggage. Others – from Mohsen Araki to Hassan Khomeini – satisfy one faction while alienating others.

The result is a leadership ecosystem designed to resist exactly the kind of surgical “replacement” operation recently witnessed in Venezuela.

That does not mean the United States will remain passive.

Senior US officials expect President Trump to take some form of action – from expanding secure internet access for protest groups via Starlink to authorising tightly limited strikes against IRGC infrastructure if violence escalates further.

But crucially, the US intelligence assessment remains that the Iranian regime is not on the brink of collapse.

As things stand, then, Washington is preparing for pressure, not regime change.

“There is no single figure who satisfies the clerics, the IRGC and the political establishment,” Sutcliffe says.

“You cannot pluck out the Supreme Leader if there is no one to replace him.”

Iran’s regime does have choices. A retreat from its nuclear ambitions would trigger sanctions relief, while reining in support for proxies such as Hezbollah would release billions back into the domestic economy.

But neither of these is likely while Khamenei remains alive.

“The regime sees the failures of Iran’s proxy network as part of the reason why Iran was hit so hard during the Israel–Iran war,” Sutcliffe explains.

“Iraqi proxies did not participate in defence, the Assad regime fell, and Lebanese Hezbollah was largely silent. To abandon the axis of resistance would make Iran even more vulnerable.”

She adds: “Economically, they don’t have many options. Essentially, the regime is trying to find every dollar it can to buy up as much rial as possible off the informal markets and stabilise the price.

“But ultimately, it will be down to China.”