The lesson of Iran: why North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons

NORTH KOREA

Strengthened by Russian support and illicit revenues, Pyongyang sees little reason to abandon the arsenal that guarantees its survival

AS Washington presses ahead with its military campaign against Iran, one leader watching events closely will be Kim Jong-un.

For North Korea’s ruler, the lesson is stark: regimes that possess nuclear weapons are far harder to coerce than those that do not.

The crisis reinforces a strategic calculation that has defined Pyongyang’s policy for decades. Nuclear weapons are not merely a military asset but the ultimate guarantee of regime survival – a shield against foreign intervention and external pressure.

“An attack on a country that wants to be nuclear just shows that having nuclear status is a deterrent,” says Jonah Kaplan, Sibylline’s principal analyst for Asia-Pacific.

That logic helps explain why denuclearisation – once the stated goal of US diplomacy – now appears largely irrelevant.

Pyongyang has repeatedly signalled that it will never surrender its arsenal, and even Washington appears increasingly resigned to that reality.

“Denuclearisation has been off the cards for several years,” Kaplan says. “But now even rhetorically people aren’t wasting their time saying it anymore.”

That pragmatic acceptance by Washington puts it at odds with Seoul, where South Korean President Lee Jae Myung prioritises freezing North Korea’s nuclear development.

The shift reflects broader changes in North Korea’s strategic position.

After years of economic hardship and pandemic isolation, the regime has quietly stabilised its finances and expanded its geopolitical leverage.

South Korean estimates suggest North Korea recorded roughly four per cent economic growth in 2024 – its strongest performance in nearly a decade.

Much of that resilience comes from unconventional sources.

Large-scale cryptocurrency theft, cyber fraud and organised criminal activity have become important revenue streams for the state, generating billions of dollars annually.

At the same time, Pyongyang’s growing relationship with Moscow has further strengthened the regime.

North Korea has emerged as a key supplier of ammunition and military equipment to Russia during the war in Ukraine, a partnership that has reportedly brought food, fuel and financial support in return.

Russian assistance has also helped Pyongyang evade sanctions and may have accelerated development of its weapons programmes.

Yet the relationship is less a traditional alliance than a partnership of convenience.

“Russia and North Korea aren’t natural allies,” Kaplan says. “What they have is strategic alignment – areas of common interest rather than a Western-style alliance.”

For Kim, the benefits are clear. The war in Ukraine has increased Moscow’s dependence on North Korean military support, while also weakening the sanctions regime designed to isolate Pyongyang.

The result is a regime that appears more secure than many analysts once predicted.

That stability has allowed Kim to think not only about survival but about the long-term future of the dynasty that has ruled the country for more than seven decades.

In recent years his young daughter, Ju Ae, has appeared alongside him at missile launches, military parades and major political events – an unusual level of public exposure for a child in one of the world’s most secretive regimes.

Last month, coverage of the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea was dominated by images of Ju Ae by her father’s side, prompting South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) to conclude that the 13-year-old may be being groomed as his successor as he prepares the ground for a possible fourth generation of family rule.

The process would necessarily take years.

North Korea remains a deeply patriarchal society, and any female successor would require careful preparation to establish legitimacy within the ruling elite.

“If you want a daughter to become leader in a paternalistic society,” Kaplan says, “you normalise it over years.”

Whether that transition will ever occur remains uncertain.

Kim himself is only in his early forties, although his heavy smoking, weight and persistent rumours about his health have fuelled speculation about long-term succession planning.

For now, the regime’s immediate strategic focus lies elsewhere.

North Korea has signalled that it may be open to dialogue with Washington but remains openly hostile towards Seoul.

Kim recently suggested relations with the United States could improve if Washington recognised North Korea as a nuclear weapons state – a condition that would effectively formalise the status Pyongyang has long claimed.

Any negotiations, however, would look very different from the ambitious disarmament deals once envisioned by diplomats.

The most realistic outcome would be a limited agreement freezing parts of North Korea’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief rather than dismantling its arsenal entirely.

“The nuclear programme exists first and foremost to deter the United States and South Korea,” Kaplan says.

Kim’s broader strategic aim is to weaken the alliance between Washington and Seoul while preserving the military capabilities that guarantee his regime’s survival.

“If he could weaken the US-South Korea alliance, that would be a major strategic victory,” Kaplan says.

For the Kim dynasty, nuclear weapons are therefore not simply instruments of military power. They underpin the political survival of the regime itself.

“North Korea is a rogue regime,” Kaplan says. “But it is a stable one, and that’s key.”

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