The US could win fast against China and still lose the war

TAIWAN

Early battlefield dominance in a conflict over Taiwan may not translate into strategic success, as industrial capacity, alliances and staying power reshape the balance over time

US forces could prevail in the opening phase of a conflict with China over Taiwan – and still lose the war.

Sibylline’s latest analysis warns that Washington’s focus on early battlefield success risks obscuring a more dangerous reality: wars are not decided by how they begin, but by whether they can be sustained.

The warning comes as recent conflicts, including the war involving Iran, expose the strain of sustaining modern warfare. High rates of munitions expenditure, fragile supply chains and uneven allied responses are already testing even well-resourced militaries.

The Lydian Trap: Operational Superiority and Strategic Risk in a US–China War focuses on the factors that sustain modern warfare – from industrial capacity and supply chains to logistics, alliances and domestic resilience.

As Sam Olsen, Chief Analyst at Sibylline and one of the report’s authors, puts it: “The US military is exceptionally strong operationally – but that only really applies to the first phase of a conflict. What matters is whether you can sustain a war, and that’s where the real vulnerabilities lie.”

The difference, Olsen says, is what wins wars early and what sustains them.

“Everyone talks about the blade – the sharp end of military power,” he says. “No one talks about the hilt, which is what lets you keep fighting.”

While US forces are likely to perform strongly in the opening stages of a conflict, the balance could shift over time as these underlying systems come under strain. China’s advantages in industrial capacity, logistics and economic resilience could prove decisive in a prolonged war.

“The longer a conflict goes on, the more the balance shifts towards China,” Olsen says.

That raises uncomfortable questions not just for Washington, but for its allies.

For decades, US military dominance has been taken as a given. But if a prolonged conflict favours China, that assumption becomes far harder to sustain.

For allies weighing whether to support US military action in a Taiwan contingency, the risks are no longer straightforward. Intervention could mean being drawn into a long war under increasingly difficult conditions. Non-intervention, however, carries its own costs.

“If the US goes into a conflict over Taiwan, it risks a situation where it may win early – but cannot sustain the war,” Olsen says.

At the same time, failing to intervene could have far-reaching consequences for alliance credibility, calling into question the reliability of US security guarantees across the Indo-Pacific.

“US intervention risks a prolonged conflict it cannot sustain. But failing to intervene will risk undermining its alliances,” he adds.

This has been made more complicated by Trump’s approach to alliances. Recent criticism of allies’ reluctance to help safeguard the Strait of Hormuz has left countries like Japan keenly aware that cooperation over China may increasingly depend on alignment with the United States in other theatres.

While comparisons with other conflicts are tempting, the structural differences in a potential US-China war are far more significant.

“China is a peer competitor,” he says. “That fundamentally changes the strategic picture.”

The challenge, he argues, lies in the gap between perception and reality in Washington.

Much of the current debate remains focused on operational performance – the ability to project force, deploy advanced systems and win the early phases of a conflict.

But that focus risks overlooking what comes next.

“There is a tendency to assume that because the US has an extraordinary warfighting capability, it can carry that through an entire conflict,” Olsen says. “History suggests that’s not how wars work.”

Instead, the outcome of a US-China conflict would likely be shaped by slower-moving, less visible factors. Industrial output, access to critical materials, the resilience of supply chains and the willingness of populations to endure economic hardship could all play a decisive role.

On several of these measures, the balance is shifting.

“The US defence industrial base is not where it was 50 years ago,” Olsen says. “And that has major implications for how long it can sustain a war.”

China, by contrast, has spent years building up its strategic depth. Its control over key supply chains, combined with its capacity to absorb economic pressure, gives it an advantage in any conflict that extends beyond the initial phase.

That creates a narrow window in which US military superiority might translate into strategic success.

For policymakers in Washington, the implications are stark. Avoiding that outcome would require significant changes – rebuilding industrial capacity, strengthening supply chains and addressing domestic vulnerabilities. But those changes would take time, and time may not be on the US side.

Olsen adds: “Unless the US wins very quickly – which is unlikely – it risks losing strategically.”—

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