The West is no longer trying to change Turkey

TURKEY

With Ankara cooling on Russia, US efforts to bring Turkey back into the F-35 programme ahead of the NATO summit point to a wider strategic reset.

US efforts to bring Turkey back into the F-35 fighter programme would have been politically inconceivable just a few years ago.

Frozen out after purchasing Russia’s S-400 air defence system in 2019, Ankara became the awkward ally that frustrated Washington, alarmed European capitals and sought to balance relations between East and West.

But that may be about to change.

Last week, Donald Trump hinted that he was preparing to reopen the door to Turkey’s return to the F-35 programme, saying he would “probably do something” that would make President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “very happy”.

The significance extends well beyond fighter jets.

With Ankara’s relationship with Moscow showing signs of strain, reopening the F-35 question would offer Washington a way to pull Turkey closer without pretending Erdoğan has become an easier ally.

Sitting astride the Black Sea and the Middle East, controlling access through the Turkish Straits and fielding NATO’s second largest standing army after the United States, Turkey has become increasingly difficult for Western governments to sideline.

It also fields the largest standing army in Europe, giving Ankara a pivotal role in strengthening European security at precisely the moment Washington wants allies to shoulder more of the burden.

“The geopolitical significance of Turkey is probably greater now than it has been for quite some time,” says Owen Williams, Sibylline’s Middle East and Turkey analyst.

For much of the past decade, Turkey has balanced relations with Russia and the West, maintaining dialogue with Moscow, refusing to join Western sanctions and positioning itself as a mediator rather than a participant in the confrontation between NATO and the Kremlin.

Yet that balance is shifting.

Ankara has consistently backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied Bayraktar drones to Kyiv, closed the Turkish Straits to Russian warships under the Montreux Convention and increasingly found itself competing with Moscow for influence in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus.

“There are definitely signs that Turkey is cooling on Russia,” Williams says.

“That doesn’t mean it’s turning against Moscow, but the relationship isn’t where it was a few years ago.”

Turkey continues to import significant volumes of Russian oil and gas and has resisted joining Western sanctions.

Trump has publicly urged Erdoğan to reduce those purchases, underscoring Washington’s long-standing objective of loosening Ankara’s dependence on Moscow.

But competition with Russia across several regional theatres, combined with the war in Ukraine, has created greater strategic distance than existed only a few years ago.

Lewis Galvin, Sibylline’s lead Americas analyst, believes Washington has recognised that shift.

“There appears to be an opportunity to draw Turkey back towards the West,” he says.

“The discussion around the F-35s isn’t simply about aircraft. It’s about strengthening the broader relationship.”

The shift is already visible elsewhere.

Earlier this month, the Trump administration also moved to review restrictions on the export of F110 and F404 engines for Turkey’s KAAN fighter and Hürjet trainer programmes, signalling a broader thaw in defence cooperation.

Until 2019, Turkey planned to acquire around 100 F-35s. Current discussions reportedly centre on an initial order of 40 aircraft.

Any breakthrough would require resolving the S-400 dispute, however, with options understood to include relocating the Russian system or placing it into long term storage.

For Washington, the benefits extend well beyond replacing ageing aircraft.

Reintegrating NATO’s second largest military would strengthen European security while helping the US shift greater strategic attention towards China.

“He still backs it as an alliance, but he wants it to be an alliance that can stand on its own two feet without the US having to supplement everything,” Galvin says.

That reflects a broader shift in US strategy.

Washington wants European allies to take greater responsibility for their own security, allowing the United States to concentrate more of its military and political attention on the Indo-Pacific without weakening NATO’s overall deterrence.

It would also preserve American influence over one of NATO’s most strategically important regional powers.

Yet Turkey itself has changed little.

In recent weeks, Turkish courts moved to overturn the leadership of the opposition CHP, while Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, widely regarded as Erdoğan’s most serious political rival, has remained in pre-trial detention on charges the opposition insists are politically motivated.

Ahead of the NATO summit, dozens of Turkish journalists were denied accreditation to cover the meeting, prompting criticism from press freedom groups.

Only a few years ago, developments like these would have dominated Western engagement with Ankara.

This time, however, they are increasingly being overshadowed by a harder strategic calculation.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the alliance’s priorities.

With Europe rearming, NATO reinforcing its eastern flank and uncertainty persisting over future US engagement, Turkey’s geography and military capability have assumed greater importance than at any point in recent history.

The apparent thaw does not mean Turkey is abandoning its independent foreign policy. It continues to pursue its own interests, maintaining relations with Russia while expanding its influence across the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa.

But rather than attempting to force Ankara back into ideological alignment, Western governments increasingly appear willing to work with an independent regional power whose interests overlap with their own.

The summit comes as NATO confronts the most dangerous security environment since the end of the Cold War, with conflict stretching from Ukraine to the Middle East and defence spending rising sharply across Europe.

The debate over the F-35 programme is therefore about far more than fighter aircraft. It reflects a broader shift in Western thinking, where Turkey’s strategic value now matters more than the political frustrations that once defined the relationship.

For years, Western capitals worried that Turkey was drifting away from the alliance. Ahead of this summit, the greater concern is making sure it stays close.

“I don’t think you’ll see many leaders at the NATO summit criticising Turkish domestic policies,” Williams says.

“Turkey’s strategic importance has become too significant to ignore.”

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