Tigray’s unfinished war: Could Ethiopia’s peace deal collapse?

ETHIOPIA

Renewed fighting in western Tigray risks reigniting one of this century’s deadliest conflicts, destabilising East Africa and accelerating Ethiopia’s economic pivot towards China.

FIGHTING in western Tigray has delivered a serious blow to the fragile agreement that ended Ethiopia’s devastating civil war almost four years ago.

Federal forces and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters clashed near Sheraro, close to the Sudanese border, on Saturday. Tigrayan authorities accused federal troops of launching an assault at dawn, while officials in Addis Ababa blamed forces loyal to TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael.

The violence follows months of military mobilisation and mutual allegations that neither side is honouring the Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022.

That deal halted two years of fighting which killed hundreds of thousands through violence, famine and the collapse of healthcare. But it failed to resolve the unresolved status of western Tigray and the disarmament of Tigrayan forces.

Benedict Manzin, Sibylline’s Senior Analyst for Sub-Saharan Africa, says the latest confrontation could mark the beginning of the agreement’s collapse.

“Western Tigray is becoming the major flashpoint that could bring this whole thing down,” he says.

The territory is controlled by Amhara forces but claimed by both regions.

Megan Sutcliffe, Sibylline’s Principal Middle East and Africa Analyst, says the crisis reflects a struggle between the TPLF’s old guard and figures more willing to work with the federal government.

The dispute led to Getachew Reda’s removal as head of Tigray’s interim administration. Getachew, who signed the Pretoria Agreement for the TPLF, has since formed a new party and become an adviser to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

Former Tigrayan commander Tadesse Worede replaced him, but the TPLF later accused Tadesse of acting as a federal puppet after Addis Ababa extended his term.

In May, the party restored Tigray’s pre-war legislative council and elected Debretsion regional president, creating two rival administrations and further dismantling the arrangements established at Pretoria.

“What we have is a long history of infighting within the TPLF, combined with a fractious relationship with the federal government,” Sutcliffe says.

“That has resulted in multiple splits, the TPLF becoming increasingly dominated by hardliners and a slow creep towards the remilitarisation of the Tigray war.”

Manzin says the TPLF has mobilised many young Tigrayan men, adding to pressures caused by displacement, food insecurity and disrupted agriculture.

He assesses that it cannot maintain such a force indefinitely without pursuing the outstanding territorial objective.

“The only thing really left for them to do, if they are to be back in charge of Tigray properly, is to recapture western Tigray,” Manzin says.

It remains unclear which side initiated Saturday’s fighting. Manzinassesses that federal forces may have been seeking to disrupt a TPLF build-up near Sudan rather than responding to the opening phase of a full offensive.

The TPLF could seek to move personnel through Eritrea and Sudan before attacking western Tigray from more than one direction, transforming a clash over contested territory into a conflict involving several states and armed groups.

Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopia against the TPLF during the 2020-2022 war. Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have since deteriorated amid Ethiopian demands for greater access to the Red Sea and speculation surrounding the Eritrean port of Assab.

Manzin says Eritrea will probably continue providing covert support to the TPLF in the hope that a prolonged insurgency will keep Ethiopia divided and delay any potential move against Assab.

Direct intervention remains less likely. Eritrea must balance an opportunity to weaken Ethiopia against its limited resources and the danger of exposing other parts of its border.

Nevertheless, that calculation could change if federal forces suffered a series of defeats.

“It is entirely possible that Eritrea begins this conflict in a much more covert, behind-the-scenes role and the Ethiopian government then suffers a number of embarrassing defeats,” Manzin says.

“At that point, Eritrea could decide: this is our moment.”

Sudan provides another potential pathway for escalation. Sutcliffe assesses that the Sudanese Armed Forces may be allowing the TPLF to establish a border presence in response to evidence that Ethiopia is facilitating operations by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

Renewed war could therefore become linked to Sudan’s civil war, while encouraging insurgents in Ethiopia’s Amhara and Oromia regions to exploit the diversion of federal forces.

“My concern is that this not only becomes a massive flare-up in Tigray, but spills over into Oromia and Amhara, adds another layer of complexity to Sudan and potentially results in a direct, protracted and extremely brutal conflict with Eritrea,” Sutcliffe says.

The humanitarian stakes are immense. “The last time we saw conflict in Tigray, some estimates indicate that more than 800,000 people died,” she adds.

The economic consequences would extend beyond the conflict zone. Western businesses reduced their exposure to Ethiopia during the previous war, while insecurity weakened interest in Addis Ababa’s privatisation programme.

Manzin says renewed conflict would suppress foreign direct investment and reverse the gradual re-engagement seen since 2022.

China, however, is likely to display a higher tolerance for instability, provided Abiy’s government survives and Beijing can continue dealing with a known partner.

“The Chinese want to know who they are dealing with,” Manzin says. “The actual conditions on the ground are less significant, provided they perceive them to be manageable.”

Renewed conflict could consequently accelerate Ethiopia’s economic pivot eastwards, consolidating Chinese influence while making it harder for Western firms to establish themselves in one of Africa’s largest markets.

The European Union may prove more reluctant to withdraw. Brussels must balance its commitment to the Pretoria Agreement against the risks of increasing irregular migration and surrendering further influence to Beijing.

Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country and a regional centre for energy, commerce and security. Its growing hydropower capacity could also make it an energy superpower within East Africa, increasing its strategic importance to both China and the West.

“China is continuing to build its influence in the region,” Manzinsays. “Ethiopia is a country we need to be engaging with.

“And in a country of this size, a humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia is a regional humanitarian crisis.”