Trump’s Saudi nuclear gamble: Will Riyadh recognise Israel?

SAUDI ARABIA

Washington has offered Riyadh access to the nuclear technology it has sought for two decades. But Trump has made its future dependent on progress towards Palestinian

LESS than 24 hours after Washington and Riyadh signed a landmark civil nuclear agreement, Donald Trump attached a condition that was absent from its public announcement: Saudi Arabia must recognise Israel.

The US president’s intervention has placed the 30-year deal in limbo, linking Saudi Arabia’s long-held nuclear ambitions to one of the Middle East’s most intractable diplomatic challenges.

The agreement, signed on 22 July, gives American companies preferential access to a Saudi programme likely to be worth billions of dollars.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright says it will uphold “the highest standards of nuclear safety and non-proliferation”, while strengthening America’s competitive position in civil nuclear technology.

But within 24 hours, Trump appeared to rewrite its terms.

The president said the agreement was “totally subject” to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and normalising relations with Israel. He also insisted that “there will be no enrichment of material”, despite reports that the deal could eventually permit uranium enrichment on Saudi soil.

The intervention has raised questions over whether Trump has converted a valuable source of leverage into a condition Riyadh cannot currently accept.

“The nuclear question is probably the biggest lever the US has had over Saudi Arabia,” says Lewis Galvin, Sibylline’s Lead Americas Analyst.

“Saudi Arabia really wants nuclear enrichment. I would not go as far as saying it is desperate, but it is borderline. It is such a significant ambition that the US recognises it almost as a Saudi weakness.”

Saudi Arabia has pursued a civilian nuclear programme for around two decades as part of its efforts to diversify its economy and reduce its reliance on oil.

The initiative forms part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 programme, which seeks to transform the kingdom into a global centre for investment, technology and advanced industry.

But nuclear power would bring political status as well as energy security.

“This is part of Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification,” says Noam Ostfeld, Sibylline’s Principal Middle East Analyst.

“It is trying to take a step back from its economic reliance on fossil fuels and develop other energy sources. Having nuclear facilities also gives it greater status on the world stage.”

Washington has another incentive to remain involved. Russia and China both possess the expertise to support a Saudi nuclear programme, potentially allowing Riyadh to seek alternative partners if the US continues to withhold its technology.

An American-led programme would instead give Washington extensive oversight of Saudi nuclear development while securing lucrative contracts for US companies.

“If we are going to put fissile material in the Middle East, at least the US will have significant control over it,” says Galvin. “Some would call that control, others influence or oversight, but the US would be heavily involved.”

The extent of that control remains unclear because the text has not been made public.

Media reports suggest the agreement provides for a two-year study into the viability of a US-built enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia. Sensitive technology would reportedly be contained within a “black box”, preventing Saudi officials from accessing it.

That would mark a significant departure from Washington’s 2009 agreement with the United Arab Emirates, under which Abu Dhabi renounced domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing.

Enriched uranium can fuel civilian reactors, but the same technology can produce weapons-grade material at higher concentrations.

Mohammed bin Salman said in 2018 that Saudi Arabia did not want a nuclear weapon, but warned that it would acquire one “as soon as possible” if Iran developed a bomb.

Galvin does not believe Riyadh is currently pursuing a weapon, arguing that it has too much to gain from maintaining its alliance with Washington. Nevertheless, he says the administration has failed to explain adequately how it will contain the proliferation risk.

“The biggest blunder they have made is not outlining how the nuclear proliferation element has been considered,” he says.

The deal has also caused concern in Israel, although Riyadh presents no immediate military threat.

Israel and Saudi Arabia were moving towards normalisation before the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Gaza. Israeli and Saudi delegations exchanged visits, while plans for an India-Middle East-Europe trade corridor promised closer economic integration.

But Riyadh later declared that it would not recognise Israel without meaningful progress towards Palestinian statehood.

Ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza and rising violence in the West Bank have made any reversal politically difficult.

Although Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian state, its rulers remain sensitive to public opinion and the kingdom’s position as a leader of the Muslim world.

“They do care about their image as leaders of the Muslim world,” says Ostfeld.

“There is a Saudi willingness for some form of normalisation because it offers the kingdom significant benefits. But publicly, Riyadh must focus on Gaza and Palestinian statehood.”

Israel’s longer-term concern is that alliances and governments can change. Access to enrichment facilities could create risks that do not exist today.

“Iran and Israel once had very good relations, but then came the Iranian revolution,” says Ostfeld. “Now they are among the bitterest enemies.”

Congress must review the agreement before it can take effect, providing time for Washington, Riyadh and Israel to reconcile their competing demands.

Ostfeld believes a defined pathway towards Palestinian statehood, potentially spread over several years, could eventually give Saudi Arabia the political space to recognise Israel.

Progress in implementing the Gaza peace plan could also alter Riyadh’s calculation.

Under present conditions, however, he considers Saudi acceptance of Trump’s demand unlikely.

For Trump, the gamble is whether Riyadh’s determination to secure nuclear technology will ultimately outweigh the political cost of recognising Israel.

“Saudi normalisation with Israel would be the ultimate foreign-policy victory for any modern US president,” says Galvin.

“Whoever achieves that will firmly cement their legacy as a leader capable of influencing the direction of the Middle East”